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by
Beverley Milton-Edwards
ABSTRACT
The insurgency that has grown in Iraq since the downfall of the
regime of Saddam Hussein and Allied occupation in April 2003, has
gripped the country in a spiral of lawlessness and anarchy.1 Despite
the presence of over 150,000 Allied forces and the training of thou-
sands of local Iraqi police and security forces, Iraq is still dominat-
ed by armed insurgents who are weakening and sabotaging post-war
reconstruction in the areas of law and order, oil production, and road
infrastructure. In this article I will contend that the most serious
dimension of this insurgency is Islamic in manifestation and examine
its importance not merely to the internal political dynamic of the
country but the wider American objective of the war on terrorism
and the discourses that surround it. These discourses include radical
Islamism, contemporary facets of foreign occupation, and the
Muslim prohibition to avoid civil conflict (fitna). In the latter part of
the article I examine the dimensions of Islamist interpretation, sup-
port, and objective to the current insurgency. This includes analysis
of both Sunni and Shi’a elements of insurgency that have arisen in
the Iraqi context as well a wider explanation of Muslim revolt
against perceived Western domination of the political, economic, and
cultural landscape of contemporary Islamism and its resurgence in
Iraq. 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary political Islam is a dimension of life that many Muslim
societies have had difficulty coming to terms with, and the radical dimension of
this phenomenon has been perceived as being a threat to prevailing political
orders. Despite this threat, most regimes have failed in totally repressing it.  That
radical Islam is a dynamic force is a foregone conclusion. As a revolutionary
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political force it presents, as was the case with Iran, a formidable challenge to
power-holders in the state. 
Whereas in the case of Iran a corrupt regime and its aggressive seculariza-
tion project resulted in growing revolutionary fervor that led to the overthrow of
the Shah in 1979, in the decades following the end of the Cold War the dynamic
of revolution and rebellion as promoted by radical Islam has assumed new char-
acteristics. Both in Islamic and non-Islamic societies there is once again an
attempt to consolidate the identity of the society – including the state – on the
basis of faith. In Islam this task is all the more complicated because of the peren-
nial tension between faith and state (din wa dawla) that has preoccupied succes-
sive generations of Muslim rulers and theologians.2 The current uncertainties
facing Iraq brings into sharp relief the issue of the role of religion or the place of
faith in politics and governance. Indeed, it may at first glance be hard to com-
prehend why a secular state such as Iraq with a well-known secular outlook
(Ba’thism was an ideology of Arab secularism) has so suddenly become vulner-
able to political Islam including its radical versions.  Upon further scrutiny, how-
ever, it is not difficult to uncover the import of Iraq’s Muslim polity and its
growth and political as well as societal resurgence throughout the latter decades
of the twentieth century. For, although Ba’thism was perpetrated by state agents
as an all-encompassing identity, as Samir al-Khalil highlights, “a degree of per-
sonal refuge from the onslaught of Ba’thism [wa]s still possible by a sort of
“reverse dissolution,” back into the arms of an original social group, whether
family or confessional.”3 Like other states in the Arab world this resurgence is
explained in part by state weakness/breakdown brought on as a result (in Iraq) of
factors such as the sanctions regime, post-war reconstruction crisis, the collapse
of the Iraqi economy, and the extent to which religious institutions, organiza-
tions, and civil society provided services and functions that in some way replaced
or provided a meaningful alternative to the state.4 Another part of the explana-
tion – again in common with other Arab state responses to Islamic resurgence –
is the extent to which, after the defeat of Iraq in its occupation of Kuwait in 1990-
91, President Saddam Hussein embarked on a state-sponsored Islamization cam-
paign (hamla imaniya) as a way of shoring up state legitimacy and meeting his
opponents on common ground.5 Religion and politics were always infused with
each other whether Saddam Hussein liked it or not. The collapse of his regime in
April 2003 unleashed both old and new religious political forces on the Iraqi
landscape. But the issue here is whether the regime collapse was the factor that
in and of itself promoted insurgency with an Islamist dimension or if other fac-
tors contributed to the emergence of a phenomenon in post-war Iraq that has be-
devilled the post-war planners? 
OCCUPATION AND INSURGENCY
State collapse as a result of the Allied coalition intervention in Iraq in the
spring of 2003 resulted in a military and administrative occupation by the
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Western powers. This process of occupation was accompanied by scenes of local
looting and disorder that the Allied troops appeared disinclined to halt.  This loss
of control was accompanied by a decision by the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) to disband the coercive arm of the Iraqi state (including the army, police,
and intelligence services) as well as to implement the de-Ba’thification of the
state, to the extent that chaos and institutional collapse occurred in every institu-
tion. The collapse of law and order was perhaps one of the most serious issues
confronting the CPA because it subsequently created a vacuum that many ele-
ments, including cronies of the Ba’thist regime, local as well as foreign Islamists,
and such others as external private security contractors, sought to exploit.  Within
this maelstrom the insurgency was born. 
The insurgency is diverse in character and tactics, in terms of participants
and end goals. Initially, the primary target constituted symbols of the “occupa-
tion,” including foreign troops and local Iraqis accused of “collaborating” in
some way. Moreover, other insurgents attacked international governmental and
non-governmental targets, such as the United Nations, the Red Cross, and inter-
national aid workers. As the insurgence gathered momentum sectarian attacks,
primarily against Shi’a and Kurdish elements, also took place. It was clear early
on in the insurgency that some elements were Islamist in inspiration. Throughout
2003 and 2004 news reports described the growing number of both local and for-
eign insurgent groups operating under the banner of Islam.6 However, as
Coalition forces began to engage the insurgents there was little time to ponder or
analyze the cause of such a virulent and growing explosion of violence and ter-
rorism coming from mushrooming Islamist groups in Iraq. 
INSURGENCE AND CHAOS: THE MUSLIM PROHIBITION
Even at the outset of an occupation that was never widely received by the
Iraqi people as a celebrated Western liberation, there was little widespread sup-
port for violent attacks against the occupation.  Not much energy existed for the
type of political revolt that has characterized other contemporary Muslim rebel-
lions.7 The uprisings of 1991 had depleted many Islamists; moreover, the
machinery of the Ba’thist state had effectively undermined the organizing capac-
ity of militant elements in opposition to authority.  In short, the means for rebel-
lion were simply not present. Survival rather than rebellion constituted the key
strategy of such Islamist elements as the Dawa party or the Supreme Council of
Islamic Revolution In Iraq (SCIRI).  Then, in the initial weeks after the war all
too often the energies of the people were preoccupied with the frenzy of looting
and disorder that took place across the country. 
The religious leadership of Iraq reacted to such chaos by calling for calm,
lawfulness and order. The fear of civil disorder (fitna) characteristic of so much
traditional Islamic thought also played its part in shaping the themes of countless
sermons and fatwa issued across the country.
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In a surprising show of unity, imams throughout Iraq have been
preaching a common message: that Iraqis should remain united and
vigilant against attempts to invoke sectarian conflict. ‘There is a per-
sistent effort to fuel tension and cause fitna [strife] between Iraq’s
Sunnis and Shi’ites,’ Sheikh Mahmoud Al-Ethawy, the imam of
Abdel-Qader Al-Kilani Mosque in central Baghdad warned his
Friday congregates.8
Yet, such factors did not deter certain Islamist elements that were prepar-
ing for irregular warfare in an attempt to gain the psychological edge over a
Western superpower which now occupied their country. Moreover, at the start of
the occupation they were able to exploit the vacuum that resulted from the
American policy to totally dismantle the forces of the old regime and to provide
an address for the grievances of the many disgruntled and demobilized soldiers
of the former Iraqi army and security structures.  The growing insurgency was
well-funded and former Sunni elements of the old Ba’thist structure welcomed
those “old soldiers” willing to oppose the occupation. In this case religion and
economic imperative were a powerful combination in grounding the incipient
insurgency as a local rather than “foreign”-led phenomenon in some Sunni cir-
cles. This is not to say that by merely reversing their policy and increasing
employment rates among the new Iraqi army the US would have been able to rec-
tify or end the insurgency. For it became increasingly clear that by deliberately
excluding such an important strand of Iraqi society from the post-war vista mar-
ginalization would be hard to reverse.9 Moreover, the insurgents both before and
after the war were able to infiltrate Iraq’s borders with radical Islamists who were
determined to bring a bloody end to America’s occupation of Iraq. 
ROOTS OF RADICAL ISLAMISM AND INSURGENCY IN IRAQ
Contrary to the assertions of the Bush administration it was clear to experts
on Iraq that the nature of the Ba’thist regime under Saddam Hussein – as secu-
larist and socialist – was in fact one of the least hospitable to radical Islam in the
Middle East at the time.10 Recent history in Iraq had been colored by a decade
long war against the radical fundamentalist regime of Iran by Saddam Hussein’s
forces encouraged by conservative Gulf States and the governments of the West.
Furthermore, the late 1980s and early 1990s had given rise to a decade where any
manifestation of Islamist opposition or Islamist radicalism in Iraq had been bru-
tally suppressed. In the south of the country where the majority of the Shi’a had
staged an uprising against Saddam Hussein in the spring of 1991 their clerical
and political leadership, along with thousands of their followers, had perished in
the officially-sanctioned massacres designed to put down the uprising and pre-
serve the regime under the personal fiefdom of Saddam Hussein. 
Historically, although the Shi’a made up a demographic majority in the
country, they had taken second place under a Sunni minority who enjoyed pref-
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erential rule designated to them by the Ottoman rulers of Constantinople. When
the British seized Iraq during World War I and set about state-building in the
post-war years, they decided to perpetuate the Sunni ruling classes as an all-too-
important indigenous prop to a Sunni monarch imported to Iraq from the Hejaz
of Arabia. Moreover, as one Shi’a representative has acknowledged, during this
period the question was not really one of a British policy designed to exclude the
Shi’a from power, but rather that the Shi’a leadership of the time,
had never governed themselves, they had never participated in a gov-
ernment. They had notions of idealism about how government
should be . . ..  And they did not want to make their hands dirty with
politics . . . and they encouraged the community to step back. So the
majority of Shi’a actually took a negative attitude towards partici-
pating in the government.11
This perspective, however, contrasts with the demand from certain Shi’a clerical
elements, as early as 1919, for Islamic government in Iraq. It didn’t take long
before the Shi’a religious leadership of the country crossed the Rubicon into the
political realm. Moreover, they achieved unprecedented unity with their Sunni
brethren in political agitation that led to local revolt and insurgency.  
Insurgent behavior against the British occupation of the new state came in
sporadic outbursts of violence throughout the early 1920s as the country inched
toward a break down of law and order. In 1920, a revolt, which included Kurds,
Sunni, and Shi’a, broke out as news filtered into the country that control of Iraq
would be held in British hands.  The locus of agitation included Shi’a cities such
as Najaf and Karbala, and some of its most important leaders were Shi’a clerics
including Mirza Mohammed Taqi Shirazi and his son Mohammed Rida Shirazi.
It is clear that Islam and the self-defense of Muslim lands from foreign occupa-
tion were a key motif and motive for the insurgence. “From their seat in the
shrine cities, the mujtahids [clerics] regarded the [British] occupation of Muslim
Iraq by Christian infidels as a sign of the collapse of Islamic civilization.”12
Action would have to be taken to recover Muslim pride.  Religious events
became a vehicle for unprecedented political protest and by the summer of 1920
a violent revolt had broken out throughout the country. For three months the
insurgency brought the country to a stand still and the British employed brutal
means to eventually put down the insurgency.  
The revolt communicated a symbol of Muslim power – autonomous from
the state – that would remain a constant element from the past to the present. This
power lay in the powerful clerical elites of the shrine cities of Iraq and the unbro-
ken bonds they enjoyed with their Shi’a counterparts in Iran.  It also succeeded
in unifying elements of society across both sectarian and class divides in ways
which, hitherto the present insurgency, had largely been neglected. As with the
Iraqi insurgency today sectarian unity was a key element of the 1920 revolt in
communicating an insurgent rejection of state authority within the framework of
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a new nascent and ultimately weak and “failed” state.13 The state was rejected,
not because of its constitutional nature – the plebiscite of 1919 had delivered
overwhelming support for this form of governance – but because of foreign tute-
lage and control of governance and state resources that made citizens of a major-
ity Muslim multi-ethnic population beholden to British power. Iraqis were not
fooled into thinking that their new monarch from the Hejaz – Faisal – was any-
thing more than a puppet for the real rulers of Iraq who were the imperial British.  
With the exception perhaps of Gertrude Bell, the woman who invented
modern Iraq, there was barely a British official that heeded the Iraqi demand for
self-determination and independence.  The British paid a high price for their
deafness to Iraqi demands and their persistence in occupation. Hundreds of
British soldiers lost their lives in the three-month revolt and a considerable eco-
nomic drain on the British taxpayer was inevitable. “Whether by accident or
design, the regime introduced after the 1920 rising took little account of the fact
that the Shi’a accounted for more than half the population of the country . . ..”14
The insurgency led Britain to reconsider its method of rule in Iraq but painful les-
sons were not fully learnt until the coup of 1958 ended the Iraqi monarchy and
its British backers. Elections did not deceive Iraqis into thinking they enjoyed
true sovereignty and independence for the continuing presence of British troops
and “advisors” was a constant reminder of where much of the power in the coun-
try really lay.  As one British official in Iraq remarked in the late 1950s, “Local
Iraqis maintained that this independence was a charade and the country was
being run by stooge governments which took their orders from the British
Embassy in Baghdad.”15 In this respect elections were not sufficient in and of
themselves to promote state, nation, and sovereignty in Iraq. The coup of 1958
heralded an era of instability within the state that would eventually lead to the
assumption to power of the Ba’th party and, by 1979, Saddam Hussein, as head
of the state. 
FAST FORWARD TO THE PRESENT
The prospect that the American-led war on Iraq might lead to the inaugu-
ration of a new era of occupation with all its implications for the resurrection of
state power, legitimacy, and authority were, I would contend, largely absent from
the post-war calculations of American planners in Washington. Instead, there was
a widespread belief that ordinary Iraqis would happily couple the act of depos-
ing a hated dictator with the wholesale import of a democratic project for Iraq
that was Western inspired, built around only western values, and would serve as
a blueprint for the rest of the Middle East. 
US administrators and politicians, however, could be forgiven for mis-
reading the signals on the import of Islam in terms of the new state structure,
governance, and the impact of external Islamist influences including radical ele-
ments.  Before the war in April 2003, the American government had assiduous-
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ly cultivated the Iraqi national opposition movement in exile, which included
powerful religious representatives from both Sunni and Shi’a communities, as
well as other religious groups, in Iraq. The INC (Iraqi National Congress), led by
Ahmad Chalabi, had convinced the US administration that the transition to
power – America’s way – would not be a difficult task in Iraq once Saddam
Hussein was deposed. Chalabi had asserted, “religious difference is not the issue
here . . .. We are all of us united in our opposition . . . and determined to bring
about a better brighter future for Iraq.”16 Many others in the loose opposition
movement to Saddam Hussein spoke of a new state for Iraq that was founded on
secular principles for its multi-ethnic and multi-religious citizenry. Kanan
Makiya contended that the war against Saddam Hussein should be about the
restoration of democracy in Iraq, led by the US, to change the regime and that
sectarian differences could be overcome in a secular framework of governance.
Yet, even at this point, figures such as Makiya were warning of the perils to
democracy of an American occupation.  “At the moment I think it is most impor-
tant to convince the US administration not to do this [democracy reconstruction]
by way of a military occupation.”17
If the Americans had been prepared to listen, however, they would have
found others within the loose coalition of opposition to Saddam who were pre-
pared to be a little bolder about their religious vision for any future Iraq. The
Islamist elements of note that had any significant influence in Iraq were the
SCIRI whose leadership attended the historic Iraqi National Opposition
Conference in London in December 2003.18 At that conference Abdul Aziz al-
Hakim, the brother of the organization’s spiritual and political leader Mohammed
Bakir al-Hakim, made clear a demand for Muslim leadership in Iraq and opposi-
tion to any form of external hegemony over the country. “Islam is the model of
inspiration . . ..  We must reject foreign intervention or rule . . .. We must main-
tain the values, lessons and true principles in the holy message . . ..”19 On the
eve of the war 1,000 of SCIRI’s al-Badr Army were deployed in the Kurdish-
Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya but remained out of American control. By September
2003, leaders of SCIRI confirmed that the group’s armed force, the Badr Corps,
remained active despite a US demand that the militia disband. 
GATHERING STORM CLOUDS
The advent of a radical, populist, or armed element of Islamism is not a
new occurrence. Radical Islam is a feature of the contemporary global landscape
that in the latter part of the twentieth century altered the nature of international
relations and global conflict and conflict resolution efforts. This can be explained
in two ways. Firstly, political Islam became a reflection of and was drawn into
the wider geopolitical and strategic battles of the Cold War. This is highlighted,
in particular, by the case of Afghanistan, but also in debates and discourses of the
Cold War as they affected a variety of Muslim countries and organizations.
Secondly, after the end of the Cold War political Islam was identified as a new
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signifier in global politics – often replacing the old communist threat – in its own
right and as an important dimension of the ethnicization of conflict in civil wars
and disputes. 
Radical Islam has emerged as a dynamic force in this modern maelstrom
of international politics and developed distinct internal identities and differences
from within as well. In this way even the radical end of the spectrum of Islam
cannot be represented in a monolithic fashion à la the 1979 Iranian revolution.
Such an approach ignores the growing importance of sectarian differences with-
in the radical camp and ascendant ideologues around whom many followers
emerged. Convergence against a common enemy was often neither as easy intel-
lectually or logistically as had been assumed at the time.  In Iraq, by the mid to
late 1990s, it was apparent that within the radical spectrum more than one ele-
ment was at work. The first was Iranian and Shi’a in origin. It stemmed from
both historical and recent alliances between neighbors and came on the heels, not
only of Iran’s tortuous experience of war at the hands of Iraq (1980-1989), but
the exodus of scholars, clerics, and others following the bloody punishments
exacted by Saddam Hussein’s regime following the Shi’a uprisings of 1991. 
The second element was found in the radical inspired factions that had
emerged from the Afghan war in the early 1990s to form a new, radical, armed,
and ideologically fanatical diaspora. Saudi fundamentalist clerics, such as Sheikh
Ali Bin Khudayr al-Khudayr and Sheikh Nasir bin Hamad al-Fahd – both of
whom were disciples of Sheikh Hamoud al-Shuaybi – were leading personalities
in this trend.  Such figures are believed, along with others, such as Yusuf al-
Ayyri, to have sanctioned to the new jihadi factions that began to emerge and
wage insurgent attacks in Iraq in the late spring of 2003.  In November 2004, a
group of Saudi clerics issued a call for Iraqis to undertake a jihad against “occu-
pation” targets in the country. This element was not indigenous to Iraq but its
near neighbors in Saudi Arabia and Jordan was host to such groups. They found
it easy to infiltrate the border into Iraq and set up in the chaos that ensued fol-
lowing the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
The jihadi elements quickly gained ground in Iraq. Their ideology of puri-
tanical theology and militancy through violent action – packaged as jihad –
appealed to those in Iraq who were left powerless in the ensuing break down in
law and order and chaos in their own society.  It became quite clear that common
cause could be made in turning the global message of the jihad groups into a
local insurgent struggle against a Western occupation of Iraq. Thousands of Arab
mujahidin elements had entered Iraq before, during, and after the war as part of
the rallying cry to wage jihad. European intelligence sources had remarked that  
[the] influx is not necessarily evidence of coordination by al-Qaeda
or other terrorist groups, since it remains unclear if the men are under
the control of any one leader or what, if any, role they have had in
the kind of deadly attacks that shook Baghdad on Monday. A
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European intelligence official called the foreign recruits ‘foot sol-
diers with limited or no training.’20
Even before the outbreak of the war Arab volunteers were reported to be cross-
ing into Iraq to begin training led by militant jihad groupings.21 As the country
slid under Allied occupation and the first suicide bombs against prominent tar-
gets in Baghdad took place sources pointed to the Arab mujahidin as the opera-
tives. 
The presence of such elements has added a new dimension to the Sunni
face of insurgency in Iraq. The involvement of Arab mujahidin in this context
reflects the global nature of the conflict as it unfolds in Iraq. This trend is sym-
bolized by the Arab jihad fighters with their extreme violent tactics and assaults
on Allied Coalition targets and local Iraqis deemed “collaborators,” such as
police and national guard personnel.  Their motivation is centered on the ideolo-
gy of a global jihad to end Western domination in Muslim lands.22 It is localized
through their alliance with Iraqi Sunni elements and common cause of antipathy
against the military dimension of the Western presence in the country. This union
introduces a new Islamist dimension to post-war politics in Iraq – accelerating
the Islamization of Iraqi society as a deeply political signifier that is posited on
a deep-seated anti-Americanism and hostility to Western external elements. The
re-rooting of Islam as a political force becomes entwined in an extreme position.
This in turn has significant consequences, as we have seen in Iraq, for the
American-promoted democracy project.23
Furthermore, this expression of Sunni insurgency in Iraq has also promot-
ed a degree of sectarian and ideological tension through a series of actual and
propaganda attacks on the Shi’a, both locally and elsewhere in the Middle East
region. This in turn has given rise to the belief that both wahabbi Saudi Arabia
and Shi’a Iran see Iraq as a new battleground for a contest for the future of the
Muslim soul. The effect of this is unedifying for the local Iraqi population that is
still clearly coming to terms with a re-ordering of the components of post-
Saddam identity as religious, political, ethnic, class, gender, rural/urban, or oth-
erwise.  By the early summer of 2003, such tensions were apparent in the mani-
festation of communal violence in Iraq and in particular a series of bomb attacks
in the Shi’a holy cities in the summer of 2003. In one such attack in Najaf near
the Imam Ali mosque suicide bombers killed 126 pilgrims, including the senior
Shi’a religious cleric Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim.24 Such attacks were
not only interpreted as a Sunni broadside against the Shi’a but as a warning to
such Shi’a elements to curb their past and present associations with the ambitions
of the Coalition for Iraq. The counter effect of such attacks was to also unleash
the more radical elements within the Shi’a community as evidenced by the grow-
ing input of Iran’s Republican Guard in the south of Iraq and the rising promi-
nence by the autumn of 2003 of the Baghdad-based Muqtada al-Sadr. Clearly,
Islamic resurgence and insurgency would go hand in hand in post-war Iraq. 
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BRINGING THE JIHAD BACK TO BAGHDAD
The manifestation of the jihad in post-war Iraq is apparent on two levels.
Firstly, in the growing band of forces that have sprung up to wage attacks against
Allied Coalition targets, along with and including local Iraqi elements considered
to be “colluding” with the enemy. The victims of this insurgency, therefore,
include regular combatants, such as soldiers of the US and British Army, Iraqi
National Guard, the Iraqi Police Force, recruits to Iraqi police force and National
Guard, as well as ordinary Iraqi civilians. An example of a civilian victim of this
insurgency gives an indication of the depth of lawlessness and insecurity that
characterizes Iraq under Allied occupation.25 Iraqi police and other security
forces are being killed at a rate of 4 to 1 compared to American soldiers and,
since the elections in January 2005 and the formation of a new government in the
spring of 2005 insurgent attacks have been on the increase against such targets.26
For it is in this security vacuum that very ordinary people have become victims,
accounting for recent statistical estimates that calculate a civilian cost of over
100,000 Iraqi lives since April 2003.27 Such elements – insurgent and criminal –
have been able to take advantage of the onset of lawlessness that erupted with the
rampage of looting beginning in April 2003. 
Secondly, there is a virtual dimension to the new jihad that is primarily
designed to be consumed by an audience external to Iraq but who broadly accord
with and support the different aims (rather than the methods) of various insurgent
elements, including the Islamists.  The virtual dimension consists of websites and
exploitation of the representative function of television media to publicize their
activities and even their goals. Counter-terrorism experts in the West have
incurred significant resources in their attempts to close down websites, and cri-
tique the media for amplifying the insurgents and the insurgency. Moreover they
even contest the applicability of the term insurgent was compared to the label of
terrorism.28 This virtual dimension, however, has contributed significantly to
turning the insurgency from a local into global affair, which, along with the
choice of Western targets, succeeds in drawing in global audiences. This in turn
has created particular pressure in foreign policy discourse, especially among
those Western governments who have or had troop deployments in Iraq.29 The
websites of the insurgent elements and their supporters are often “closed down”
if servers are located abroad but such closures are quickly defied and new inter-
net sites appear. Even when “virtual insurgents” involved in operating such sites
are arrested or killed other supporters quickly replace them.  The sites function
for information propagation, as a means of virtual communication, and possibly
recruitment of supporters into activists for the insurgency in Iraq. The authentic-
ity of such sites and the materials (audio and video) is often questioned but it fails
to diminish the campaigning ability of associated insurgent elements. One such
site, entitled Muaskar al-Battar (Battar Camp), hosts a series of articles and
guides to tactical warfare and techniques. It is a virtual Islamic insurgent equiv-
alent of Che Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare Manual of the 1960s. It is supported
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by “virtual insurgents” outside of Iraq located elsewhere in the Muslim world
and the West.  Government authorities in such states have tried to halt the pro-
liferation of such Islamist websites fearing the extent to which they amplify the
message and power of the extremists.  In Iraq the internet has become an impor-
tant weapon in the insurgency. 
There is no overarching organizational structure that currently propels the
insurgency in Iraq but various groups ranging from Ba’thist and Arab Socialists
to Salafi foreign jihad are now involved in the insurgency. As has already been
noted, although these elements are disparate they converge over the common
conviction that Western elements must be evicted from Iraq. They are united in
a belief that Iraq has been seized as a result of Western force and violence, and
that it must be reclaimed through the same means. They regard the Western pres-
ence as a further episode in a modern crusade led by the West against the Muslim
East. These elements have benefited from the support of individuals who are
experienced in command and control, enlisting support and funding from both
local and external sources.  Such groups are supported by individuals located in
Syria and Jordan who travel to Iraq to direct and provide supplies to various
insurgent elements.30 While it is acknowledged that the insurgency is ideologi-
cally multi-faceted the banner of Islam dominates the insurgent landscape. As an
excerpt from the leader of  Tawhid wa Jihad, Abu Musab Zarqawi, makes clear,
at the height of the Fallujah showdown in November 2004,
America and her allies have fully realized this unmistakable fact, and
consequently, the earth shook up under their feet. They know only
too well that the winds of Jihad will dismantle their thrones and
crack and wobble their foundations. They set aside their difference
and became united under one banner to fight their one and only
enemy, Islam. The infidels have realized that what is happening now
is a true Jihad, and the banner (under which this Jihad is operating)
is “No God but Allah.”31
Tawhid wa Jihad is but one of the many small Iraqi-based groups that has
mushroomed since the commencement of the Allied occupation of Iraq and the
subsequent handover of authority to the interim government led by Iyad Allawi
in the early summer of 2004. These groups are populated by both Arabs and
Iranians, locals and foreigners.  Some of these elements operate autonomously
from each other and degrees of rivalry also exist. Some insurgents that were
prominent in 2003, had, by 2005 been eclipsed by others who appeared to be
marshalling or receiving widespread local support. 
From the early months of the Allied occupation it was evident that an
incipient insurgency – led by Islamists – was apparent in Iraq. Many of the thou-
sands of Arab fighters who had traveled across the border to Iraq from elsewhere
in the region did not return home but remained and found a place for themselves
in the Sunni towns and cities in Baghdad and the Triangle.32
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THE SUNNI BANNER 
In a Shi’a majority country such as Iraq is it surprising that one distinct
face of the Islamist insurgency is Sunni? If the insurgency is a reflection of a
local power struggle then there is a historic determinism to the events that have
unfolded since the US occupation of the country that ousted Saddam Hussein. As
I have detailed earlier in this article, the Sunnis of Iraq had traditionally enjoyed
a degree of power that did not necessarily accord with their demographic
strength in this multi-religious and ethnic society.33 The collapse of the Hussein
regime also signalled a threat to Sunni hegemony over the apparatus of the Iraqi
state and all the privileges this accrued.  These fears were realized when it
became apparent that Sunni representation in the Interim Governing Council
headed by Iyad Allawi would amount to no more than 20 percent of the seats. 
Furthermore, there were genuine fears in many Sunni circles that retribu-
tion of sorts would be exacted by their Shi’a compatriots in the new order.  Such
fears were evident in the early organization of Sunni religious elements and the
extent to which such groups looked to supporters outside of Iraq as well.
Sectarian tensions have subsequently increased and led to a more communal
approach to politics for the new Sunni “minority.” This propelled many Sunni
clerics in Iraq to reassess their position and voice in the community. Unlike the
Shi’a clergy who were historically autonomous and later persecuted for their
opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein, Sunni clerics were latterly tied to
the state through Saddam Hussein. Post-war the challenge lay in seeking to
establish an independent network of religious and, inevitably, political authority
for the Sunni. This has been manifest in a variety of ways. The founding of the
Committee of the Muslim Ulema (CMU) in 2003 as a religious institution of the
Sunni clergy has been successful in attracting a significant level of support with
over 3,000 joining the organization. The members of the CMU claim the middle
ground among Muslims in Iraq.  Moreover, in the absence of a Sunni equivalent
of the Shi’a Marja’ias (council-opinions of Ayatollahs) there was an aspiration
that the CMU could represent and protect the rights of Sunni.  Indeed, the CMU
claims to be the Sunni counterpart to the Shi’a Marja’ias, or central spiritual
authority, which is led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf. It is allegedly
supported financially by a number of rich businessmen who donate large
amounts of money to the organization. 
During the siege of Fallujah in April 200434 the CMU announced, “We are
the political arm of the resistance fighting to evict American forces from Iraq.”
Its leaders acted as intermediaries during the US assault on Fallujah and the siege
of Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf in April 2004. Throughout the siege it interceded
between guerrilla groups and foreign diplomats that had their nationals kid-
napped, working to try to secure the release of several kidnapped nationals.  They
have also issued a fatwa condemning the kidnapping of foreigners as un-Islamic.
Nevertheless, fearful of the power of their Shi’a counterparts and the relative
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importance of the traditional hawza structures and the importance of Ayatollah
Sistani’s legitimacy for the Western reconstruction project, CMU leaders have
publicly warned against sectarian division in Iraq.  It’s leaders have issued state-
ments against cooperating with the Occupation authorities and called for peace-
ful civil disobedience. They also opposed participation in the legislative elections
held in January 2005. 
Since its early foundations then the CMU has enjoyed good relations with
Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shi’a clerical supporters of the al-Mahdi army. During
the clashes between the al-Mahdi Army and Iraqi Forces backed by Allied forces
in Najaf.  CMU formed a delegation led by its member Fawzi Kubaisi to meet
Muqtada and offer their support. Moreover, the CMU delegation visited Najaf
with the approval of the Iraqi Interim Government. Unbeknownst to the govern-
ment the delegation took food and ammunition and secretly handed them over to
the Mahdi fighters.35
The CMU claims to represent a wide spectrum of Sunni Muslims in Iraq
but the leadership has been taken over by a wing of Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood.
However, other groups of Muslim scholars, including the Iraqi Islamic Party
(which has a seat on the Interim Governing Council), have denounced the CMU
as irrelevant impostors who represent no one. Some of these critics claim the
CMU are merely re-branded Ba’thist passing as Sunni representatives. The CMU
does have Shi’a members and this, it is believed, allays fears that the body is sec-
tarian and promotes Muslim unity in the face of American occupation. Well-
known Shi’a figures include Najaf-based Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi who is close
to Ayatollah al-Sistani, and Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi of the Kadumiya neighbor-
hood in Baghdad. Ayatollah Najafi is one of the most powerful Ayatollah’s in
Iraq and a possible successor to Ayatollah Sistani. 
Hani Ashour, Baghdad correspondent of the London-based Arabic news-
paper, Al Quds al Arabi, credits the council with much influence in post-war Iraq.
“Their leaders occupy the main Sunni mosques, each commanding the loyalty of
thousands of believers,”36 he says. The council claims to embrace groups as
diverse as austere Salafi fundamentalists and mystical Sufis, but is led by a cabal
of the Iraqi wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, a political organization seeking the
creation of an Islamic state.
However, its claim to represent the resistance was undermined when a
Baghdad mosque run by strict Islamic puritans was plastered in posters denounc-
ing the council members as impostors, and warning them not speak in the name
of the resistance. Fakhri al-Qaissi, a Salafi who recently established his own
council to represent Iraq’s Sunnis, says the council is largely irrelevant: “The
Muslim Scholars Council speaks for no one but themselves.”37 There were sim-
ilar denunciations from the Islamic party, led by a rival group of Muslim
Brotherhood leaders who accepted US administrator Paul Bremer’s invitation to
join the Iraqi Governing Council. “These people [in the CMU] are good at giv-
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ing speeches, but they have little impact on the ground of Fallujah,”38 said Hakim
Hassani, the party’s deputy, who also claims to be leading negotiations and
orchestrating relief to Fallujah.
The divisions among Sunni groups underline US difficulties in finding a
Sunni leader to represent Iraq’s minority Muslim sect. And, although the CMU
still claims to embrace Sunni Islamist elements from Sufis to fundamentalist
Salafis, and other Sunni leaders, including Iraqi Islamic Party member and inter-
im government minister Hakim Hassani, there is not doubt that the CMU has at
its core an all-important faction drawn from the Iraqi wing of the Sunni Muslim
Brotherhood. What they have lacked is the ability to lead Sunni Muslims away
from insurgency and into the electoral fold in post-war Iraq. In late December
2004, the Iraqi Islamic Party also withdrew from the elections. Moreover, only
two percent of voters turned out for the January election in the Sunni-dominated
province of al-Anbar leaving Sunni Islamists largely bereft of a voice in the leg-
islative assembly and government that would go on to negotiate the Iraqi consti-
tution. 
The CMU are closely rivaled on the political front by radical salafi (fun-
damentalist) Sunni elements. Originally these groups were drawn from areas of
Iraq that bordered Saudi Arabia and are deeply influenced by salafi trends with-
in that state and elsewhere in the region. They enjoy significant financial support
from donors in Saudi Arabia and have been associated directly either with al-
Qaeda or other Mujahidin in Afghanistan. Along with a locally drawn member-
ship these groups include hundreds of fighters who came from neighboring coun-
tries and Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Egypt. They have been present in towns
such as Fallujah for some time and local sources have reported that they enjoy
support from local civilians, ex-Ba’thists, and ex-military officers who are nom-
inally in control. 
Local sources also reported that in Fallujah they are revered as heroes and
called the new Mujahidin. At the local graveyard the deaths of these fighters are
recorded on the tombstones of the “Mujahideen of Saudi Arabia who came to
fight the infidel Americans and paid with his life for a just cause.”39 Few would
dare to speak out in public against the presence of these fighters, even if they
believed that without their presence Fallujah might be a safer place, nor would
anyone dare openly to deny the impact that they have had on the communal iden-
tity of a city like Fallujah. 
Increasingly, Sunnis have been compelled to retreat into their own geo-
graphic communities and enclaves, such as Fallujah, Mosul, and the Adhamiyyah
district in Baghdad. Fallujah became the locus of much of the insurgence. It is
where pivotal groupings, such as the Mujahidin Shura Council, led by local
Sunni clerics, and jihad groups, such as Tawhid wa Jihad under Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, have been located and supported.  
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THE FALLUJAH FACTOR 
The city of Fallujah, located south-west of Baghdad has come to symbol-
ize the nature of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. By this I mean that in Fallujah and
its outlying villages one finds evidence of the amorphous mix of foreign Salafi,
local jihad, and ex-Ba’thist Sunni elements mounting a serious assault on the
Allied occupation. Fallujah is a traditional and conservative city that has always
worn its piety on its sleeve. The city has a large number of mosques whose
imams and worshippers have always been open to the sermons of radical Islamic
ideologies.40
Under occupation the city fell increasingly to the authority of this mix of
Sunni forces. By early 2004, the jurisdiction of the city lay in the hands of the
various Islamist groups known collectively as the Mujahidin. Each element is led
locally by an emir (prince). These elements have taken sole responsibility for
security and law and order in the city, mounting their own guards, vehicle check-
points, and so forth. Within the locally organized elements the tribes of the city
are also represented. The emirs are all members of the Majlis as-Shura
(Consultative Council) founded in February 2004, and are headed by two local
clerics, Abdullah al-Janabi and Dafir al-Ubaidi. Al-Janabi has called the
mujahidin of Fallujah “the sons of the city” providing protection to its inhabi-
tants.41 Al-Janabi allegedly has led foreign as well as local mujahidin. His organ-
ization enjoyed support from former Ba’thist, shared intelligence, and engaged
in proxy sabotage operations against US targets. In return, Ba’thist intelligence
has assisted al-Janabi in avoiding American capture.42 The influence of these
Islamist insurgents has also been apparent in the social and political regulation of
the city. The Arabic press reported that the Majlis as-Shura effectively estab-
lished a theocracy in the city with Islamization of social mores and values, such
as dress, banning alcohol consumption, and so forth, high on the agenda of this
cabal.43
Days before the US offensive against the city in early November 2004, al-
Janabi’s organization issued a bayan (communiqué) declaring “an outmost
sacred jihad and civil rebellion in retaliation for any coalition forces and puppet
government attack on Fallujah.”44 The defeat of the insurgents and the re-cap-
ture of Fallujah, however, have not eradicated the Sunni insurgency. Both local
and foreign leaders survived the assault, insurgents mounted raids in other Iraqi
towns, and in a statement issued after the US capture of Fallujah Sheikh al-Janabi
declared, “‘The Americans have opened the gates of hell,’ Abdullah Janabi said
Monday in Fallujah. ‘The battle of Fallujah is the beginning of other battles.’”45
The continuance of the insurgency elsewhere in Iraq throughout the winter of
2004 and spring of 2005 appeared to undermine the American ambition of
democracy bringing an end to insurgency in Iraq. 
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THE UNITY COMMUNITY? SHI’ISM AND THE INSURGENCY
Despite the early violence that beset the Shi’a religious leadership and the
attacks on their followers, US administrators of Iraq in Baghdad and Washington
believed that the omens were good with respect to marshalling widespread Shi’a
support for their reconstruction and democracy project.  Key to this ambition has
been Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, the prime marja, or spiritual guide for the Shi’a.
As the most senior Shi’a cleric in Iraq, forced under Saddam Hussein to remain
virtually underground, the political dimensions of leadership in the new era have
been a challenge. This low-key style has led al-Sistani’s leadership to be criti-
cized by younger Shi’a leaders, including supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr.  Al-
Sistani, however, has continued to reject demands for an Iranian theocratic model
for post-war Iraq, arguing instead for a separation between faith and politics in
the affairs of the new Iraqi state. 
The Ayatollah has avoided the political arena, only speaking out to urge the
Shi’a to avoid violence against Western occupation forces and to participate in
elections to the national assembly. He has been consistent in his demand for elec-
tions in Iraq, and a corresponding early exit for occupation troops. He under-
stands and believes that democracy and free elections will deliver an Islamic out-
come in Iraq.46 In January 2004, thousands of his supporters held demonstra-
tions calling for free elections in Iraq. As a religious and spiritual leader al-
Sistani commands huge respect but this does not mean that he presides over a
community of believers that is unified in either its attitude to the Western pres-
ence in Iraq or the best means to bring its end about. 
Al-Sistani was a key mediator in the Shi’a insurgent fighting that took
place in May 2004 helping to broker an all-important ceasefire. But when he was
forced to London in August 2004 due to health problems the young guard flexed
their muscles again.  
NAJAF NEXUS 
The leader of the Najaf insurgency had already exerted influence in
Baghdad and other Shi’a towns in southern Iraq, and is also seen to enjoy a sig-
nificant religious inheritance in terms of Iraq’s Shi’a community. For insurgent
leader Muqtada al-Sadr, often discounted as a minor irritant by US administra-
tors in the early months of the occupation, is the son of the late Grand Ayatollah
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr who was murdered under the regime of Saddam
Hussein. Muqtada’s father enjoyed an influential following among Iraq’s urban
poor and dispossessed, and his tracts, sermons, and input into social and welfare
programs emphasized the important social justice and mobilization mantra at the
heart of al-Sadr’s vision. Muqtada inherited his father’s vision, and social influ-
ence and standing in the poor neighborhoods of Baghdad, Najaf, and other cities
such as Basra and Hilles. 
Al-Sadr and his followers also played a pivotal role in asserting a law and
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order function in many Shi’a areas, providing much needed security in the wake
of the power vacuum that emerged in the early months of the occupation. It was
claimed that, “The Sadr movement wants an Islamic republic in Iraq even if not
one exactly like the one Khomeini built in Iran. Press reports from the slums of
Baghdad suggest that Muqtada is idolized there and that most of the armed mili-
tiamen now patrolling the neighborhoods of the renamed Sadr City (formerly
Saddam City) are his followers.”47 Indeed, a symbol of this influence was appar-
ent in the renaming of a Baghdad slum from “Saddam/Revolution City” to “Sadr
City.” For the residents of this slum al-Sadr appeared to offer protection to the
Shi’a community against a Western presence in Iraq that was represented as pos-
ing both a political as well as physical threat to the people.  This was summarized
in a statement from Sheikh Hassan, an al-Sadr supporter, who remarked that,
“We just want the American troops to stay out of our city because they are killing
everyone . . .. Nobody expects good things from the soldiers any longer since
they break every promise they make to us.”48 Whilst the fighting in Sadr city led
by al-Sadr was soon over, it flared again in Najaf in the summer of 2004 as
Ayatollah al-Sistani was temporarily incapacitated due to ill-health. 
For al-Sadr, al-Sistani’s absence offered an opportunity to propel the insur-
gency according to his own agenda, including military engagements with US
forces. And while it may have appeared that there were great disparities between
al-Sistani and al-Sadr by this point the only difference was one of tactics rather
than aims. This was seen over the issues of opposition to the US occupation and
the desire for an Islamic political outcome in Iraq.  Although al-Sistani may have
been at variance with the young guard represented by al-Sadr because he
believed that elections would bring an end to occupation and a US withdrawal
from Iraq, nevertheless, al-Sadr wanted the US out of Iraq first so the Muslims
would then be the masters of their own sovereignty and fate. 
Al-Sadr’s prophecy of Iraq signaled his conviction that the future Iraqi
state should be unambiguously Islamic rather than being an accommodation of
power with other ethnic, sectarian, and secular forces, which he believed al-
Sistani supported. In this respect al-Sadr’s insurgency and his followers could
not be ignored, for they represented ideas and enjoyed a constituency that has
widespread support among the Shi’a of Iraq. These Shi’a were fearful of remain-
ing marginal in post-war Iraq. They had already seen an interim administration
whose Shi’a leaders were not necessarily considered to be their own – indeed
even al-Sistani ordered Shi’a governing council members to boycott the cere-
monies for the “handover” of US administrative power in the summer of 2004.
The fact that the Mahdi Army that follows al-Sadr had proved itself capable of
mounting a credible insurgency against the Americans had also won al-Sadr as
much praise as criticism.  The exclusion of Sadrist forces from governance has
been cited as a strategic error by the Americans as was their inability in Iraq “to
accept that there are political forces on the ground in Iraq . . . [that] it cannot dic-
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tate . . . without frankly becoming a colonial power . . ..”49
Al-Sistani has drawn widespread criticism for his principle of non-inter-
vention in the spiraling political crisis that has gripped Iraq since the interim gov-
ernment took authority in the summer of 2004. Non-intervention as a principle
has not always elided well with the local demands of Shi’a in Iraq for their com-
munities to be protected from within. Al-Sistani’s engagement with al-Sadr dur-
ing the Najaf crisis also elevated al-Sadr’s status – one that his critics say belies
his true abilities and power. 
Iran, although publicly eschewing a role for itself in determining Shi’a
dynamics in Iraq – “The policy of Iran is to solve the problems of Iraq. We want
calm in that country”50 – has indeed exerted considerable influence with respect
to insurgent activities. By the late summer of 2004, it was an openly acknowl-
edged fact that the Iranian republican guard had established a significant pres-
ence for itself in Shi’a cities.  In cities like Basra, just 20 miles from the border
with Iran, the Iranian supported Hizb Allah operated openly in providing civilian
assistance and organization.51 Iran’s influence in Iraq was designed to work as a
countervailing force not only to American influence but Saudi Arabian as well.52
Such elements provided as much succor to al-Sistani as al-Sadr.  Moreover,
rumors circulating in Baghdad in late October 2004 alleged that arms handed
into the Iraqi authorities in return for payments by Sadr city militants were also
being quickly replaced by weapons bought and supplied by Iran.53
While it may be true that Iraqi Shi’a leaders differ in their discourse on
Iraqi democracy, it is clear that they are do not want a democracy based on an
Iranian model — with the Vilayat-a-Fiqih as its centerpiece. Rather, al-Sistani
envisages a Shi’a-led democracy that is moderately Islamist and guided by
Shari’a in which clerics do not play a dominant role. Al-Sistani favors a form of
“separation of powers,” though not in the traditional Western sense. In al-
Sistani’s view the clerics would stay aloof from the day-to-day transactions of
government, but would intervene periodically to give direction on broad moral
questions. Najaf’s clerics have not been impressed by the system of Vilayat-a-
Fiqih in Iran, because they see it as having resulted in inertia caused by the end-
less struggle between a clerical executive and a popularly elected legislature.
Iraqis speculate that al-Sistani saw his vision of elections which would
peacefully empower Shi’a moderates as collapsing before an assertive Iranian
policy and Sadr’s onslaught.54 This represents the core divide between al-Sistani
and the Iranians. The Iranians see as naive the hope that the “quietist” al-Sistani
approach will yield the outcome espoused by al-Sistani.  Iran believes that the
US will pursue its interests in a secular, Westernized, global capitalist govern-
ment in Iraq ruthlessly. Iran has pointed to the US determination to destroy
Muqtada al-Sadr as a political force as evidence of this viewpoint.55 The deep-
ening crisis in Najaf brought this argument to a head: the possible US destruc-
tion of al-Sadr seemed to confirm the Iranian view for many Shi’a and create
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conditions for a wider Shi’a insurgency against the US occupation — which Iran
could then fan for its own purposes.
Al-Sistani believed that if the Allawi government was totally discredited,
its ability to mount elections might collapse. Given these factors, al-Sistani saw
no alternative to his intervention. While he has no love for the occupation, he rec-
ognized that without some resolution to the Najaf crisis, his plans for a moderate
Shi’a democracy would be finished. His intervention was not intended to set a
political agenda (as the terms of his peace plan make clear), but to provide
breathing room so that elections could go forward. Al-Sistani strongly believed
that those elections will deliver an Islamist victory in Iraq.
TRUTH OF PROPHECY
Al-Sistani’s ambition for elections in Iraq was of course realized in January
2005.  When the election results were announced the following month it was
confirmed that the Shi’a parties had won more than 47 percent of the vote to the
275-member national assembly charged with writing a new constitution for the
country. The results of the vote reversed the historic political marginalization of
the majority Shi’a population translating their demographic significance into leg-
islative power for the first time in the history of the state.  Moreover, the religious
list of the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) won more votes than the secular Shi’a
list of former Provisional Government head, Iyad Allawi. The INA is a coalition
of three distinct groupings under the Shi’a umbrella, including SCIRI led by Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim, the al-Dawa Party headed by Ibrahim al-Ja’afari, and the sec-
ular Iraqi National Congress led by Ahmad Chalabi. Half the INA consisted of
party members and half of independents approved by al-Sistani’s aides. They jos-
tled for votes in the poll alongside an alliance of 30 small Shi’a parties who
opposed the clerical composition of the INA. The virtual absence of Sunni
Islamist parties meant that an opportunity to counter the “politics of the insur-
gence” was lost as a result of self-imposed marginalization and the obvious lack
of security in Sunni areas at a time when religious identity has become more and
more important.56 The new government that was formed in the months of hag-
gling that followed the elections results offered only token representation to
Sunni elements and came amidst an alarming spiral of insurgent activities that
left thousands injured and hundreds dead. American officials also recognized the
importance of political stability as a counter-force to the instability that the insur-
gents were provoking.57
The understandable Western preoccupation with democracy, elections,
constitution, and power-sharing government coalitions in Iraq, however, ignores
the principle preoccupation of Islamists in general and the insurgents in particu-
lar with the continuing presence of what it considers to be military forces of the
American and British occupation in Iraq. From this perspective – summed up in
the positions and views outlined by both Sunni and Shi’a Islamist elements in
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Iraq – democracy was not the problem, American intervention was. In this way
the Islamist elements of the insurgency in Iraq have captured a more widely
expressed antipathy toward foreign intervention in Iraq and the rest of the Middle
East. One expression of this antipathy, echoing the sentiments of Iraqis a gener-
ation before regarding British influence, was revealed in the Newsday/CNN poll
of 2004 in which the majority polled believed that any transfer of power “would
not reduce US influence in Iraq.”58
THE WIDER MESSAGE
Much scholarship on political Islam since 9/11 has conflated such activi-
ties with a sense of growing global Muslim rebellion directed at unpopular lead-
ers at home and Western government’s abroad. Yet, at the outset of any insur-
gency there may be little by way of popular local support. Those who undertake
training in guerrilla warfare or who volunteer for a jihad may be an insignificant
element of a wider Muslim population.  Nevertheless, as history demonstrates, in
Iraq and other Muslim domains there is a point in the wider political environment
where insurgents derive popular support for the overthrow of authority. This may
even be at a point where the insurgents understand that they will never win mil-
itarily but achieve change through the legitimacy derived from an emasculated
wider population who support their goals. This psychological dimension to con-
temporary Muslim rebellion and social protest is often overlooked by opponents
seeking to dominate militarily.   
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the manifestation of insurgency and its Islamist
dimension in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003. It has
demonstrated that the incipient insurgency that broke out in the wake of the US-
led occupation has impacted deeply on a multi-faceted Muslim population who
have felt less secure under US-led protection than they did under Saddam
Hussein’s brutal regime: 71 percent of Iraqis surveyed for a US poll in Spring
2004 believed the US to be “occupiers” not “liberators” of their country.59
This could well be because in its analysis of the politics of the Muslim
world post-9/11 Western policy makers have believed that the call to put Islam at
the center of any political project in Muslim domains is simply part of a wider
plot by al-Qaeda for global domination. In Iraq they have failed to understand
that many of the Muslim insurgents parallel the deep sense of unresolved griev-
ance in the Muslim world against the West as a result of what it regards at unwar-
ranted Western interference in Muslim countries, exploitation of their resources,
and disrespect for their faith.  
Furthermore, will the rising Islamic insurgency in Iraq remain unsupport-
ed and simply whither and die as a result of overwhelming US firepower? Firstly,
it is important to remember that the insurgency in Iraq is positively helped by its
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irregular and diverse character. By this I mean that there is more than one con-
stituency of support at work here – both inside and outside the country. What
unites them is hostility to foreign occupation in their country. This means that
rather like a wild fire as one local insurgency is “put out” through US military
might another will rise elsewhere in Iraq – each time with a different constituen-
cy of support. Only the Kurdish areas are likely to remain untainted. Moreover,
as the Soviets learnt in Afghanistan, for every terrorist “taken out” in a military
operation more spring up to take his place. In Iraq there has been no shortage of
volunteers for the fight. In April 2005, there were 67 suicide attacks by insur-
gents alone and the virtual dimension of this campaign also ensures that support
and the number of Muslim volunteers remains constant despite on-the-ground
setbacks. The stream of foreign jihads prepared to come to Iraq and with local
support undermine the American presence through terrorism, had, by the spring
of 2005, taken on a limitless quality that was alarming Western military and intel-
ligence officials.60
In the wake of the Fallujah offensive in November 2004 and the victory of
US forces in killing and capturing the insurgents and freeing the city from their
grip it appeared that the Islamic insurgency in Iraq had reached a crossroads.
Down one road lay the prospect of such events radicalizing mainstream Islamist
groups and constituencies in the country into a wider embrace of the insurgent’s
goals and even their tactics. The other road lay in finding the means to allow
Islamists a voice and power in governance through meaningful popular partici-
pation and an end to a policy perceived as constructing an artificial mode of dem-
ocratic governance that was avowedly secular in orientation and presided over by
an elite of former-exiles. This meant finding a place for the spectrum of Shi’a as
well as Sunni Islamist identity through structures of governance in Iraq.  To some
extent the Iraqi elections of January 2005 created the opportunity for inclusion
for some but not all Islamic elements. The challenge inherent in constitution
making in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious state now lies in finding further
means of balancing the competing demands for Islamic governance, democratic
rule, and accommodation of power that recognizes the ethnic rights of the
Kurdish people. In this way the Islamist dimension of the insurgency will surely
be diminished.  
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